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Abstract—This work investigates the secrecy capacity of the
Wiretap Broadcast Channel (WBC) with an external eavesdrop-
per where a source wishes to communicate two private messages
over a Broadcast Channel (BC) while keeping them secret from
the eavesdropper. We derive a non-trivial outer bound on the
secrecy capacity region of this channel which, in absence of
security constraints, reduces to the best known outer bound to
the capacity of the standard BC. An inner bound is also derived
which follows the behavior of both the best known inner bound
for the BC and the Wiretap Channel. These bounds are shown to
be tight for the deterministic BC with a general eavesdropper, the
semi-deterministic BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper and the
Wiretap BC where users exhibit a less-noisiness order between
them. Finally, by rewriting our outer bound to encompass the
characteristics of parallel channels, we also derive the secrecy
capacity region of the product of two inversely less-noisy BCs
with a more-noisy eavesdropper. We illustrate our results by
studying the impact of security constraints on the capacity of the
WBC with binary erasure (BEC) and binary symmetric (BSC)
components.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic secrecy was first introduced by Shan-
non in his seminal work [1]. He investigates a communication
system between a source, a legitimate receiver and an eaves-
dropper where the source and the legitimate receiver share a
secret key. It is shown that, to achieve perfect secrecy, one has
to let the key rate be at least as large as the message rate. This
result motivated the work [2] by Wyner who introduced the
notion of Wiretap Channel. In such a setting, a source wishes
to transmit a message to a legitimate receiver in the presence
of an eavesdropper but without resorting to a shared key.
Besides communicating reliably to the legitimate receiver at a
maximum rate, the source has to maximize the equivocation
at the eavesdropper so that it cannot recover the message sent
over the channel. In the case of perfect secrecy, the conditional
probability of the message given the eavesdropper’s observa-
tion has to be approximately uniform over the set of messages,
i.e., there is no leakage of information to the eavesdropper. The
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surprising result of Wyner’s work [2] is that the use of a secret
key is no longer required to guarantee a positive equivocation
rate or even perfect secrecy. Csiszár & Körner’s [3] generalized
this result –first derived with the assumption of a degraded
eavesdropper– to the general BC and where the source must
also transmit a common message to both users. As a matter
of fact, an analysis of the corresponding rate region regarding
the necessity of two auxiliary random variables, namely, rate
splitting and channel prefixing, was carried out by Ozel &
Ulukus in [4]. It was shown that under specific channel
ordering the rate region requires only one or even none of
these variables.
Several multi-terminal Wiretap networks were studied, e.g.,
the MAC Wiretap Channel has been investigated by Liang &
Poor in [5] while physical layer security in broadcast networks
was studied by Liang et al. in [6] though, the capacity region
is yet to be fully characterized.
Related works
The Wiretap Broadcast Channel (WBC) was first studied
under two types of secrecy constraints. The Broadcast Channel
(BC) with confidential messages where the encoder transmits
two private messages, each to its respective user, while keeping
both of them secret from the opposite user. In [7], inner
and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity were derived. The
secrecy capacity of the semi-deterministic BC with confiden-
tial messages is derived in [8] while in [9] it is assumed
that only one message has to be kept secret from the other
user and the capacity of the semi-deterministic eavesdropper
setting was characterized. As for the Gaussian MIMO BC with
confidential messages, it was considered in the works of Liu
et al. in [10], [11] while the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver
wiretap channel was addressed by Ekrem & Ulukus in [12]
(see [13], [14] and references therein).
An alternate setting is the BC with an external eavesdropper
where the secrecy requirement consists in that all messages
be kept secret from the eavesdropper which is different from
both users. Following this setting, the capacity of some classes
of ordered and product BCs were first investigated by Ekrem
& Ulukus in [15] [16], where the legitimate users’ channels
exhibit a degradedness order and the eavesdropper is more-
noisy than all legitimate users’ channels. In a concurrent work
by Bagherikaram et al. in [17], the secrecy capacity was
characterized for the case where the eavesdropper is degraded
towards the weakest user and also for its corresponding
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel model.
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2Main contributions
In this work, we consider the Wiretap BC where the encoder
transmits two private messages to two users while it wishes to
keep them secret from an external eavesdropper. We derive
both an outer bound and an inner bound on the secrecy
capacity region of this setting. The outer bound is obtained
through a careful single-letter derivation that addresses the
main difficulty of our setting which relies on upper bound-
ing techniques for three terminals’ problems. It should be
emphasized that both converse techniques for the standard
BC and the Wiretap Channel require the use of Csiszár &
Körner’s sum-identity [3] which does not apply to more
than two output sequences. Besides this well-known difficulty,
our outer bound clearly copies the mathematical form and
behavior of the best known outer bound for the BC without
an eavesdropper [18]. As for the inner bound, our techniques
simply follow the notion of double binning, superposition
coding and bit recombination. It also generalizes the inner
bound of [16] in the case of secure messages only, and, in
the absence of secrecy requirement, the obtained inner bound
naturally reduces to Marton’s inner bound for the BC with
common message [19].
By developing an equivalent but non-straightforward rep-
resentation of the outer bound, we show that it matches
the inner bound for several novel classes of non-degraded
Wiretap Broadcast Channels. More precisely, we are able to
characterize the secrecy region of the following settings:
1) The deterministic BC with an arbitrary eavesdropper
where both legitimate users observe a deterministic
function of the input,
2) The semi-deterministic BC with a more-noisy eaves-
dropper where only one of the legitimate users is a
deterministic channel while the other is less-noisy than
the eavesdropper,
3) The less-noisy BC with an eavesdropper degraded re-
spect to the best legitimate user,
4) The product of two inversely less-noisy BC with a more-
noisy eavesdropper.
Besides of novel secrecy capacity results, the outer and the in-
ner bound also recover some known results, e.g., the degraded
BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper [15] which generalizes
the degraded BC with a degraded eavesdropper [17].
We finally illustrate the results by investigating the impact
of secrecy constraints on the capacity of the Wiretap Broadcast
Channel with binary erasure (BEC) and binary symmetric
(BSC) components. To his end, we derive the secrecy capacity
region of a Less Noisy BEC/BSC BC with a degraded BSC
eavesdropper and compare it to the standard capacity region,
i.e. without secrecy constraints. In this setting, the central
difficulty arises from the converse part for which we were
able to show, through convexity arguments, a novel inequality
on the conditional entropy of binary sequences. Indeed, this
inequality appears to be crucial in the study of the WBC
with BSC and BEC components, similar to Mrs. Gerber’s
lemma [20] for the binary symmetric BC. The analysis of the
secrecy capacity region proved that the degraded eavesdrop-
per’s impediment can be very severe on the BSC user whilst,
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Figure 1: The Wiretap Broadcast Channel (WBC).
it would still allow, for the worst degraded case, for positive
rates for the BEC user.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we give relevant definitions of the Wiretap BC
setting and the main outer and inner bounds. We then show
in Section III that the obtained bounds are tight for various
classes of WBCs. In Section IV, we fully characterize the
capacity region of the BEC/BSC Broadcast Channel with a
BSC eavesdropper. Sections V, resp. VI are dedicated to the
corresponding proofs of the outer, resp. inner bounds. Last,
summary and concluding remarks are drawn in Section VIII.
Notations
For any sequence (xi)i∈N+ , notation x
n
k stands for the
collection (xk, xk+1, . . . , xn). xn1 is simply denoted by x
n.
Entropy is denoted by H(·), and mutual information by I(·; ·).
E resp. P denote the expectation resp. the generic probability
while the notation P is specific to the probability of a random
variable (rv). ‖X‖ stands for the cardinality of the set X .
We denote typical and conditional typical sets by Tnδ (X)
and Tnδ (Y |xn), respectively (see Appendix A for details). Let
X , Y and Z be three random variables on some alphabets
with probability distribution p. If p(x|yz) = p(x|y) for each
x, y, z, then they form a Markov chain, which is denoted by
X −
− Y −
− Z. The binary entropy function h2 is defined
∀x ∈ [0 : 1] by
h2(x) , −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x),
and the binary convolution operator (?) as: x?y , x(1−y)+
(1− x)y for all (x, y) ∈ [0 : 1]2 .
We will use FME to designate Fourier-Motzkin elimination.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECRECY CAPACITY BOUNDS
Hereafter, we introduce the Wiretap Broadcast Channel
(WBC) as represented in Fig. 1, and then derive both an outer
and an inner bound on its secrecy capacity region.
A. The Wiretap Broadcast Channel
• Consider an n-th extension of a three-user memoryless
Broadcast Channel:
Wn = {PY n1 Y n2 Zn|Xn : Xn 7−→ Yn1 × Yn2 ×Zn} ,
defined by the conditional p.m.f:
PY n1 Y n2 Zn|Xn ,
n∏
i=1
PY1,iY2,iZi|Xi .
3• An (M1n,M2n, n)-code for this channel consists of: two
sets of messages M1 and M2, an encoding function
that assigns an n-sequence xn(w1, w2) to each message
pair (w1, w2) ∈ M1 ⊗M1 and decoding functions, one
at each receiver, that assign to the received signal an
estimate message (wˆj) in Mj , j ∈ {1, 2} or an error.
The probability of error is given by:
P (n)e , P
( ⋃
j∈{1,2}
{
Wˆj 6= Wj
})
.
• A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there exists
an (M1n,M2n, n)-code satisfying:
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log2Mjn ≥ Rj ∀ j ∈ {1, 2} ,
lim sup
n→∞
P (n)e = 0 ,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(W1W2|Zn) ≥ R1 +R2 .
Note that the last constraint implies that for some se-
quence n of positive values:
I(W1W2;Z
n) ≤ nn ,
which implies individual secrecy constraints given by
I(Wj ;Z
n) ≤ nn , ∀ j ∈ {1, 2}.
• The secrecy capacity region is the closure of the set of
all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2).
B. Ordered Broadcast Channels [21]
A Broadcast Channel X → (Y,Z) is said to be degraded,
say Z is degraded with respect to Y if the following holds:
∃ q(z|y) such that P (z|x) =
∑
y∈Y
P (y|x)Q(z|y) ,
A channel output Y is said to be “less-noisy" than Z, or Z is
said to be “more-noisy" than Y if
∀PU such that U −
−X −
− (Y,Z) , I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;Y ) .
C. Outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the WBC
We next present an outer bound on the secrecy capacity
region of the WBC under study. This bound originates from a
careful single-letter characterization and accounts for different
channel configurations which provides the secrecy capacity
region for some new classes of wiretap broadcast channels.
Theorem 1 (Outer bound). The secrecy capacity region of the
Wiretap BC with an external eavesdropper is included in the
set of rate pairs satisfying: x
R1≤ I(U1;Y1|TV1)− I(U1;Z|TV1) , (1)
R1≤ I(U1;Y1Y2|TV1V2)− I(U1;Z|TV1V2) , (2)
R1≤ I(U1;Y1|TV1U2)− I(U1;Z|TV1U2) , (3)
R1≤ I(U1;Y1Y2|TV1U2V2)− I(U1;Z|TV1U2V2) (4)
R2≤ I(U2;Y2|TV2)− I(U2;Z|TV2) , (5)
R2≤ I(U2;Y2Y1|TV1V2)− I(U2;Z|TV1V2) , (6)
R2≤ I(U2;Y2|TV2U1)− I(U2;Z|TV2U1) , (7)
R2≤ I(U2;Y2Y1|TU1V1V2)− I(U2;Z|TU1V1V2) (8)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1) + I(U1S1;Y1|TV1)
−I(U1S1;ZY2|TV1) , (9)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1V2) + I(U1S1;Y1Y2|TV1V2)
−I(U1S1;ZY2|TV1V2) , (10)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y1|TZV2) + I(U2S2;Y2|TV2)
−I(U2S2;ZY1|TV2) , (11)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y1|TZV1V2) + I(U2S2;Y2Y1|TV1V2)
−I(U2S2;ZY1|TV1V2) , (12)
for some joint input p.m.f
PTV1V2U1U2S1S2X = PTV1V2U1U2S1S2PX|U1U2S1S2
such that (T, V1, V2, S1, S2, U1, U2)−
−X −
− (Y1, Y2, Z).
Proof: The proof of this theorem is relegated to Sec-
tion V.
The next corollary proceeds to the reduction of some
auxiliary rvs which can be removed without reducing the rate
region. This simplifies the complexity of the optimization of
the many variables present in the bound.
Corollary 1 (Outer bound). The rate region stated in Theo-
rem 1 implies the next outer bound:
R1≤ I(U1;Y1|TV1)− I(U1;Z|TV1) , (13)
R2≤ I(U2;Y2|TV2)− I(U2;Z|TV2) , (14)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1) + I(U1;Y1|TV1)
−I(U1;ZY2|TV1) , (15)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y1|TZV2) + I(U2;Y2|TV2)
−I(U2;ZY1|TV2) , (16)
for some joint input p.m.f PTV1V2U1U2X such that
(T, V1, V2, U1, U2)−
−X −
− (Y1, Y2, Z).
Proof: The proof is relegated to Section V-C.
It is easy to check that by removing the secrecy constraint,
i.e., if Z is dropped, the above rate region reduces to the best
known outer bound to the capacity of the standard BC [18,
Lemma 3.5]. Moreover, this outer bound will prove to be
crucial to characterize the secrecy capacity of several classes
of WBCs, as will be stated later on.
D. Inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the WBC
In this section, we present an inner bound on the secrecy
capacity region of the WBC. The coding argument combines
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Figure 2: Deterministic BC with an arbitrary eavesdropper.
both stochastic encoding to achieve secrecy and the standard
coding techniques for the BC, i.e., superposition coding and
random binning to let the sent codewords be arbitrarily depen-
dent.
Theorem 2 (Inner bound). The secrecy capacity region of the
WBC includes all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying:
R1≤ I(QU1;Y1|T )− I(QU1;Z|T ) , (17)
R2≤ I(QU2;Y2|T )− I(QU2;Z|T ) , (18)
R1 +R2≤ I(U1;Y1|TQ) + I(QU2;Y2|T )
−I(QU1U2;Z|T )− I(U1;U2|TQ) , (19)
R1 +R2≤ I(U2;Y2|TQ) + I(QU1;Y1|T )
−I(QU1U2;Z|T )− I(U1;U2|TQ) , (20)
R1 +R2≤ I(QU1;Y1|T ) + I(QU2;Y2|T )− I(QU1U2;Z|T )
−I(U1;U2|TQ)− I(Q;Z|T ) , (21)
for some joint p.m.f PTQU1U2X such that (T,Q,U1, U2) −
− X −
− (Y1, Y2, Z) and I(U2;Y2|TQ) + I(U1;Y1|QT ) ≥
I(U1;U2|TQ).
Proof: The full proof of this inner bound is given in
Section VI.
Remark 3. It is worth mentioning here the relative behavior
of this inner bound with the one of Theorem 1 in [16] where
the authors relied on similar encoding techniques as the ones
we resort to in the proof of achievability.
The corresponding inner bound is clearly included in and it
can be investigated whether these two inner bounds are indeed
equal, similarly to [22], since the encoding is similar and only
decoding strategies differ: successive decoding for [16] and
joint decoding in our case.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY OF SOME WIRETAP BROADCAST
CHANNELS
In this section, we derive the secrecy capacity of various
Wiretap Broadcast Channel models.
A. Deterministic BC with an arbitrary eavesdropper
Let us assume that both legitimate users’ channel outputs
are deterministic functions of the input X , as shown in Fig. 2.
Theorem 4 (Secrecy capacity of the deterministic BC with a
general eavesdropper). The secrecy capacity of the determin-
istic BC with an arbitrary eavesdropper’s channel is given by
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with a more-noisy eavesdropper.
the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying:
R1≤H(Y1|Z) , (22)
R2≤H(Y2|Z) , (23)
R1 +R2≤H(Y1Y2|Z) , (24)
for some input p.m.f PX .
Proof: We start with the achievability part for which we
evaluate the inner bound in Theorem 2 by setting: Q = ∅,
U1 = Y1 and U2 = Y2. The claim follows then in a
straightforward manner. As for the outer bound, it follows from
the reduced outer bound in Corollary 1, by writing the next
set of inequalities for j ∈ {1, 2}:
I(Uj ;Yj |Vj) − I(Uj ;Z|Vj)
≤ I(Uj ;YjZ|Vj)− I(Uj ;Z|Vj) (25)
= I(Uj ;Yj |Z, Vj) (26)
≤ H(Yj |Z) (27)
with strict equality if Uj = Yj and Vj = ∅. Note also that:
I(X;Y2|ZV1) + I(U1;Y1|V1)− I(U1;ZY2|V1)
≤ I(X;Y2|ZV1) + I(U1;Y1|ZY2V1) (28)
≤ H(Y2|ZV1) +H(Y1|ZY2V1) (29)
≤ H(Y1Y2|Z) (30)
with strict equality if U1 = Y1 and V1 = ∅. The second
sum-rate yields the same constraint. Thus, the outer bound
is maximized with the choice U1 = Y1, U2 = Y2 and
V1 = V2 = ∅.
Below, we generalize the equality between the regions
in Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 to the case of the Semi-
Deterministic BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper.
B. Semi-deterministic BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper
Let us assume that only Y1 is a deterministic function of
X but we further assume that Y2 is less-noisy respect to the
eavesdropper’s output Z, as shown in Fig. 3.
Theorem 5 (Secrecy capacity region of the semi-deterministic
BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper). The secrecy capacity of
the semi-deterministic BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper is
the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying:
R1≤H(Y1|ZQ) , (31)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) , (32)
R1 +R2≤H(Y1|ZQU) + I(U ;Y2|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (33)
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Figure 4: Degraded BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper.
for some joint p.m.f PQUX = PQPU |QPX|U such that
(Q,U)−
−X −
− (Y1, Y2, Z) .
Proof: Achievability follows from the rate region stated
in Theorem 2 by letting: Q = T and U1 = Y1. As for
the converse, we will first evaluate the outer bound given in
Corollary 1. Since Y2 is less-noisy than Z, then one can easily
notice that:
I(U ;Y2|V Q)− I(U ;Z|V Q) ≤ I(UV ;Y2|Q)− I(UV ;Z|Q) .
(34)
Considering the same chain of inequalities as in (26)-(27), one
can write the outer bound as:
R1≤H(Y1|ZQ) , (35)
R2≤ I(UV ;Y2|Q)− I(UV ;Z|Q) , (36)
R1 +R2≤H(Y1|ZQUV ) + I(UV ;Y2|Q)− I(UV ;Z|Q)(37)
and thus, defining (UV ) = U , we can write that the outer
bound is the union over all p.m.f PQUX = PQPU |QPX|U of
the rate region given in Theorem 5.
Remark 6. When Y2 is not less-noisy than Z, it is not clear
yet whether the two bounds can be tight due to the fact that
the auxiliary rv V does not seem to be useless then.
C. Degraded BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper
In this section, we assume that the legitimate user Y2 is
degraded respect to the legitimate user Y1. Moreover, assume
that both users are less-noisy than the eavesdropper as shown
in Fig. 4. The capacity region of this setting was first derived
in [23], and here, we simply rely on the optimality of our outer
bound for this setting.
Theorem 7 (Secrecy capacity region of the degraded WBC
[23]). The secrecy capacity region of the degraded WBC is
given by the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying:
R1≤ I(X;Y1|TU)− I(X;Z|TU) , (38)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2|T )− I(U ;Z|T ) , (39)
for some input p.m.f PTUX where (T,U)−
−X−
−(Y1, Y2, Z).
Proof: To show this, we first note that the outer bound
given in Theorem 1 is included in the following outer bound
obtained through keeping only the constraints:
R1≤ I(U1;Y1Y2|TV1U2V2)− I(U1;Z|TV1U2V2) , (40)
R2≤ I(U2;Y2|TV2)− I(U2;Z|TV2) . (41)
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Figure 5: Less-Noisy BC with a partly degraded eavesdropper.
Now, since Y2 is degraded respect to Y1, then
I(U1;Y1Y2|TV1U2V2) = I(U1;Y1|TV1U2V2) , (42)
and since Y1 is less-noisy than Z we can write
I(U1;Y1|TV1U2V2)− I(U1;Z|TV1U2V2)
≤ I(U1V1;Y1|TV1U2)− I(U1V1;Z|TU2V2) (43)
≤ I(X;Y1|TU2V2)− I(X;Z|TU2V2) . (44)
Thus, the outer bound reduces to the union over all joint p.m.fs
PTUX of the rate region given in Theorem 7.
In the sequel, it turns out that the outer bound we derived
yields also the capacity region of another class of ordered BC,
which does not include the class of degraded BC with a more-
noisy eavesdropper as will be clarified shortly.
D. Less-Noisy BC with a partly degraded eavesdropper
Let us assume that Y1 is a less-noisy channel than Y2 and
that Z is a degraded version of Y1. As shown in Fig. 5, this
model is more general than the one first considered in [17],
while it does not really generalize the model in Fig. 4, first
considered in [23]. Notice that in this setting the eavesdropper
is not compulsorily degraded. However, the present class
is wider in that users are no longer compulsorily degraded
between them and the eavesdropper is no longer more noisy
than the weaker legitimate user.
Theorem 8 (Secrecy capacity region of the less-noisy WBC).
The secrecy capacity region of the ordered WBC under study
is the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying:
R2≤ I(U ;Y2|T )− I(U ;Z|T ) , (45)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y1|ZUT ) + I(U ;Y2|T )− I(U ;Z|T ) ,(46)
for some joint p.m.f PTUX = PTPU |TPX|U such that (T,U)−
−X −
− (Y1, Y2, Z).
Proof: The converse follows from the outer bound in
Corollary 1 by keeping only the terms:
R2≤ I(U2;Y2|TV2)− I(U2;Z|TV2) , (47)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y1|TZU2V2) + I(U2;Y2|TV2)
−I(U2;ZY1|TV2) , (48)
and defining the common auxiliary rv T ≡ (T, V2). As for
the achievability, let U1 = X and Q = U2 in the inner bound
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given by Theorem 2. This bound reduces to:
R1≤ I(X;Y1|T )− I(X;Z|T ) = I(X;Y1|ZT ) , (49)
R2≤ I(U ;Y2|T )− I(U ;Z|T ) , (50)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y1|ZUT ) + I(U ;Y2|T )− I(U ;Z|T ) ,(51)
R1 +R2≤ I(X;Y1|T )− I(X;Z|T ) = I(X;Y1|ZT ) . (52)
The first bound is redundant with respect to the last one.
Moreover, since Y1 is less-noisy than Y2, then the bound (52)
becomes redundant with respect to (51). The inner bound
reduces henceforth to the one given in Theorem 8.
In the sequel, we study a non-straightforward extension of
this WBC for which the secrecy capacity region remained
open since the previous results in literature apply only to the
degraded BC case.
E. Product of two inversely less-noisy wiretap broadcast chan-
nels
The product of inversely less-noisy broadcast channels is
defined as the product of two less-noisy WBCs. The BC
(Y1, T1) has a component Y1 which is less-noisy than T1 and
an eavesdropper Z1 is degraded towards the best user Y1 and
more-noisy than the worst user T1. The BC (Y2, T2) is less-
noisy in the inverse order and the eavesdropper Z2 is degraded
towards T2 and more-noisy than Y2.
Theorem 9 (Product of two inversely less-noisy BCs with a
more-noisy eavesdropper). The secrecy capacity region of such
a setting is given by the set of rates pairs (R1, R2) satisfying:
R1≤ I(X1;Y1|Z1) + I(U2;Y2)− I(U2;Z2) , (53)
R2≤ I(X2;T2|Z2) + I(U1;T1)− I(U1;Z1) , (54)
R1 +R2≤ I(X1;Y1|Z1) + I(U2;Y2)− I(U2;Z2)
+I(X2;T2|Z2U2) , (55)
R1 +R2≤ I(X2;T2|Z2) + I(U1;T1)− I(U1;Z1)
+I(X1;Y1|Z1U1) , (56)
for some input p.m.f PU1X1U2X2 = PU1X1PU2X2 that satisfies
(U1, U2)−
− (X1, X2)−
− (Y1, Y2, T1, T2, Z1, Z2).
Proof: The proof is quite evolved in that it requires a new
outer bound formulation, and is thus relegated to Appendix G.
Note here that, in the absence of the eavesdropper, this
theorem yields the capacity region of the product of two
reversely less-noisy BCs which, though not proved in [24],
can be deducted from the result of [25] for the product of
reversely more-capable BCs.
IV. THE BEC/BSC BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH A BSC
EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we characterize the capacity region of the
BEC/BSC broadcast channel with an external BSC eavesdrop-
per. This model falls into the class of ordered BCs and is
extremely rich since the BC (BEC and BSC) provides for
a variety of orderings following the respective values of the
erasure probability “e" and the crossover probability “p", as it
is summarized in the table I and shown in [26]. Let us consider
the channel model where:
W :
 X 7−→ Y1 ≡ BEC(e) ,X 7−→ Y2 ≡ BSC(p2) ,X 7−→ Z ≡ BSC(p) . (57)
0 ≤ e ≤ 2p 2p < e ≤ 4p(1− p) 4p(1− p) < e ≤ h(p) h(p) < e ≤ 1
Degraded Less-noisy More-capable Es.Less-noisy
Table I: Different orderings allowed by BEC(e) and BSC(p)
models.
We will consider the case where Y1 is less-noisy that Y2 and
where Z is degraded towards Y2. Besides, we make sure that
Z is degraded towards Y1. 1 Summarizing these constraints,
we end up with the inequalities:
2p2 ≤ e ≤ min{2p, 4p2(1− p2)} . (58)
Theorem 10 (Secrecy capacity region of the BEC(e) /BSC(p2)
BC with BSC(p) eavesdropper). The capacity region of the BC
with BEC(e) / BSC(p2) components and a BSC(p) eavesdrop-
per, defined by the constraint (58) where 1 − 4p(1 − p) ≥
4p2(1− p2), is given by the set of rate pairs satisfying:
C :
{
R1 ≤ (1− e)h2(x) + h2(p)− h2(p ? x) ,
R2 ≤ h2(p ? x)− h2(p2 ? x) , (59)
for some x ∈ [0 : 0.5].
Proof: The proof consists in evaluating the capacity
region of such an ordered channel given by R, the set of
rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(X;Y1|TU)− I(X;Z|TU) = I(X;Y1|ZTU) ,
R2 ≤ I(U ;Y2|T )− I(U ;Z|T ) = I(U ;Y2|ZT ) ,
(60)
and is two fold. The challenging part is obviously the converse
part since it requires the use of an inequality, similar in a way
to Mrs. Gerber’s lemma [20] applied to the secrecy capacity
region, which we have been able to prove only under the
assumption 1 − 4p(1 − p) ≥ 4p2(1 − p2), although there is
strong evidence that the converse can be proved besides this
case.
Note that T = ∅ maximizes the region since it can easily be
shown to be convex and thus, will not need the time-sharing
variable T . Moreover, we can state a cardinality bound on the
auxiliary rv U used in evaluating the previous region following
the usual Fenchel-Eggleston-Caratheodory theorem that is it
1It is worth emphasizing here that our choice of Z degraded respect to Y2
follows from that both channels are naturally degraded since these are BSC
channels. Otherwise, if Y2 were to be degraded respect to Z, no positive rate
could be transmitted to user 2 .
7suffices to evaluate the region using an auxiliary rv with a
quaternary alphabet.
First, note that the choice X = U⊕V where U ∼ Bern(0.5),
V ∼ Bern(x) yields that X ∼ Bern(0.5) and that X|U ∼
Bern(x). Thus, we can write:
I(X;Y1|U) = (1− e)H(X|U) = (1− e)h2(x) , (61)
I(X;Z|U) =h2(p ∗ x)− h2(p) , (62)
I(U ;Y2) = 1− h2(p2 ∗ x) , (63)
I(U ;Z) = 1− h2(p ∗ x) , (64)
which proves the inclusion of the region R in the rate region
C, i.e., the achievability.
As for the inclusion in the appositive way, i.e., the converse,
we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If 1− 4p(1− p) ≤ 4p2(1− p2), then R defines a
convex set.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
Now, since R and C define convex bounded sets, then both
are uniquely defined by their supporting hyperplanes. And
finally, sinceR is included in C, it thus suffices to show that all
their supporting hyperplanes intersect, so let then λ ∈ [0 :∞[.
We want to show that2:
max
(R1,R2)∈C
R1 + λR2 ≤ max
(R1,R2)∈R
R1 + λR2 . (65)
Let us choose the following notation: U is an auxiliary
rv that takes its values in U = {1, . . . , ‖U‖} following the
law: P(U = u) = PU (u) , Pu. Let us assume that X is a
Bern(α) distributed Binary rv and that3 P(X = 0|U = u) =
PX|U (0|u) , xu.
Define the set P of admissible transition probabilities as:
P ,
{
(α, x‖U‖,p‖U‖) = (α, x1, . . . , x‖U‖, p1, . . . , p‖U‖)
∈ [0 : 0.5]‖U‖+1 × [0 : 1]‖U‖
s.t
‖U‖∑
u=1
pu = 1 ,
‖U‖∑
u=1
puxu = α
}
. (66)
With this, note that:
max
(R1,R2)∈C
R1 + λR2
= max
PUX
U−
X−
(Y1,Y2,Z)
I(X;Y1|U)− I(X;Z|U)
+λ
[
I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
]
(67)
= max
(α , x‖U‖ , p‖U‖)∈P
h2(p) + λ
[
h2(p2 ∗ α)− h2(p ∗ α)
]
+
∑
u∈U
Pu
{
(1− e)h2(xu)− h2(p ∗ xu)
+λ
[
h2(p ∗ xu)− h2(p2 ∗ xu)
]}
(68)
2Note that the maxima are well defined for both regions due to the
cardinality bound (for C) and for the closed and bounded interval for R
which results in compact supports for both optimizations.
3U is the support of the law PU , as such, PX|U (0|u) is well defined.
(a)
≤ max
(α , x‖U‖ , p‖U‖)∈P
h2(p)
+
∑
u∈U
Pu
{
(1− e)h2(xu)− h2(p ∗ xu)
+λ
[
h2(p ∗ xu)− h2(p2 ∗ xu)
]}
(69)
(b)
≤ h2(p) + (1− e)h2(xλu)− h2(p ∗ xλu)
+λ
[
h2(p ∗ xλu)− h2(p2 ∗ xλu)
]
(70)
= max
(R1,R2)∈R
R1 + λR2 , (71)
where:
xλu = arg max
{
(1− e)h2(x)− h2(p ∗ x)
+λ
[
h2(p ∗ x)− h2(p2 ∗ x)
]}
. (72)
Now, (a) follows from the fact that since x, p1, p2 ∈ [0 : 1/2]
and p ≥ p2, then:
∀α ∈ [0 : 1/2] , p2 ∗ α ≤ p ∗ α ≤ 1/2 (73)
then max
α∈[0:1/2]
[h2(p2 ∗ α)− h2(p ∗ α)] = 0 (74)
with equality for α = 1/2. As for (b), it is a direct result of
the existence of a value of xλu that maximizes the expression,
and from that letting U = {0, 1} and P0 = P1 = 12 and U 7−→
X ≡ BSC(xλu), leads to this maximum value equality in (b)
in addition to being admissible: P0xλu +P1(1−xλu) = α = 12 .
This ends the proof of equality of the two rate regions.
In the sequel, we evaluate the effect of eavesdropping on
such a BEC(e)/BSC(p2) BC with a BSC(p) eavesdropper.
First note Cstd the standard capacity region of the BC
without an eavesdropper, C being its secrecy capacity region.
We have that [26]:
Cstd :
{
R1 ≤ (1− e)h2(x) ,
R2 ≤ 1− h2(p2 ? x) , (75)
for some x ∈ [0 : 0.5].
The presence of eavesdropper engenders an impediment on
the sum rate given by 1 − h2(p), that does not depend on
the choice of the channel parameters (e, p2). As such, it turns
out that the channel to user 2 ,i.e. BSC(p2) is very sensitive
to such the BSC(p) eavesdropper in that it could have zero
admissible rate R2 if the eavesdropper were to have a channel
as good as to allow for p = p2. However, and that’s peculiar
to the BEC(e) channel, user 1 always has strictly positive rates
whatever the value of p, since e ≤ 2p ≤ h2(p) and thus, a
rate of h2(p)− 2p > 0 is always achievable.
To illustrate this, we consider the following transmission
scheme where e = 2p, i.e. the worst eavesdropper is consid-
ered for user 1, and where we vary p in the interval [p2 : 0.5].
Fig 7 plots the obtained curves. As expected, the eavesdropper
has no impediment on the available rates for both users when
p is close to 0.5, however, as p decreases, the gap between
the standard capacity region and the secrecy capacity region
increases, and the rate available at user 2 decreases to zero
whilst that of user 1, stays above a given threshold.
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Figure 7: Secrecy capacity region of the BC with
BEC(e)/BSC(p2) components and a BSC(p) eavesdropper.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: OUTER BOUND
In this section, we prove the outer bound in Theorem 1,
since this rate region is symmetric in the rates Rj , j ∈ {1, 2},
the constraints will be shown only for the following two single
rates and two sum-rates:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|TV1)− I(U1;Z|TV1) , (76)
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1Y2|TV1V2)− I(U1;Z|TV1V2) , (77)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1) + I(U1S1;Y1|TV1)
−I(U1S1;ZY2|TV1) , (78)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1V2) + I(U1S1;Y1Y2|TV1V2)
−I(U1S1;ZY2|TV1V2) . (79)
A. Single rates’ constraints
By Fano’s inequality we have that:
nR1 ≤ I(W1;Y n1 ) + n n . (80)
Moreover, from the secrecy constraint: I(W1;Zn) ≤ n n.
Thus, one can write that:
n(R1 − 2n)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 )− I(W1;Zn) (81)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 )− I(W1;Zi|Zni+1)
]
(82)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Z
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 )− I(W1Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1)
]
(83)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 Zni+1)− I(W1;Zi|Y i−11 Zni+1)
]
(84)
where (a) and (b) follow both from the Csiszár & Körner’s
sum-identity (156):
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zni+1;Y1,i|W1Y i−11 )− I(Y i−11 ;Zi|W1Zni+1)
]
= 0 , (85)
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zni+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 )− I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1)
]
= 0 . (86)
We then define: U1,i = W1, V1,i = Y i−11 and Ti = Z
n
i+1,
which yields the first single rate constraint.
In the same fashion, we can write the other single rates by
treating the two outputs Y1 and Y2 together, i.e Y1 ∼ (Y1, Y2)
letting V2,i = Y i−12 . We end up with the couple of constraints:{
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|TV1)− I(U1;Z|TV1) ,
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1Y2|TV1V2)− I(U1;Z|TV1V2) .
(87)
Furthermore, similar all manipulations can be performed by
starting from the Fano’s inequality and secrecy requirement:
nR1 ≤ I(W1;Y n1 |W2)− I(W1;Zn|W2) + n n . (88)
Thus, we could condition over U2,i = W2 the two previous
rate constraints to obtain:{
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|TV1U2)− I(U1;Z|TV1U2) ,
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1Y2|TV1U2V2)− I(U1;Z|TV1U2V2) .
(89)
B. Sum-rate constraints
Let us start by Fano’s inequality writing:
nR1 ≤ I(W1;Y n1 )− I(W1;Y n2 Zn) + I(W1;Y n2 Zn) + n n .
(90)
Then, combining with the following constraint obtained from
Fano’s inequality:
nR2 ≤ I(W2;Y n2 Zn|W1) + n n , (91)
we can write:
n (R1 +R2) ≤ I(W1;Y n1 )− I(W1;Y n2 Zn)
+I(W1W2;Y
n
2 Z
n) + 2n n . (92)
Now, let us elaborate on that:
I(W1;Y
n
1 )− I(W1;Y n2 Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Y1,i|Y i−11 )− I(W1;Y2,iZi|Y n2,i+1Zni+1)
]
(93)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 )
−I(W1Y i−11 ;Y2,iZi|Y n2,i+1Zni+1)
]
(94)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Y
i−1
1 Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)
−I(W1Y i−11 Y n2,i+1Zni+1;Y2,iZi)
+ I(Y n2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Y2,iZi)− I(Y i−11 ;Y1,i)
]
,(95)
where (a) is again a consequence of Csiszár & Körner’s sum-
identity (156):
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1;Y1,i|W1Y i−11 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ;Y2,iZi|W1Y n2,i+1Zni+1) . (96)
9As for the other term, note that:
I(W1W2;Y
n
2 Z
n) =
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Y2,iZi)
−I(Y n2,i+1Zni+1;Y2,iZi)
]
.(97)
Looking at the first term of the last equality:
n∑
i=1
I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Y2,iZi)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1Z
i−1;Y2,iZi)
−I(Zi−1;Y2,iZi|W1W2Y n2,i+1Zni+1)
]
(98)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1Z
i−1;Y2,iZi)
−I(Y n2,i+1Zni+1;Zi|W1W2Zi−1)
]
(99)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1W2Z
i−1;Zi)
+I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1Z
i−1;Y2,i|Zi)
]
(100)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1W2;Zi|Zi−1) + I(Zi−1;Zi)
+I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1Z
i−1;Y2,i|Zi)
]
. (101)
Here, (a) is a consequence of Csiszár & Körner’s sum-
identity (156) but between the outputs Z and (Y2, Z):
n∑
i=1
I(Zi−1;Y2,iZi|W1W2Y n2,i+1Zni+1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Zi|W1W2Zi−1) . (102)
Using the secrecy constraint, one can then notice that:
n∑
i=1
I(W1W2;Zi|Zi−1) = I(W1W2;Zn) ≤ n n . (103)
Moreover, observe that:
n∑
i=1
I(Zi−1;Zi) =
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1;Zi) , (104)
and
I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1Z
i−1;Y2,i|Zi)
≤ I(W1W2Y n2,i+1Zni+1Y i−11 Zi−1;Y2,i|Zi) . (105)
The sum-rate can be then bounded as follows:
n(R1 +R2 − 2n)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 )− I(W1;Y n2 Zn) + I(W1W2;Y n2 Zn)(106)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Y
i−1
1 Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)
−I(W1Y i−11 Y n2,i+1Zni+1;Y2,iZi)
+ I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1Y
i−1
1 Z
i−1;Y2,i|Zi)
+ I(Zni+1;Zi)− I(Y i−11 ;Y1,i)
]
. (107)
And to end, we use the following remarks:
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zni+1;Zi)− I(Y i−11 ;Y1,i)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−11 Z
n
i+1;Zi)− I(Y i−11 Zni+1;Y1,i)
]
(108)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−11 Z
n
i+1;Y2,iZi)− I(Y i−11 Zni+1;Y1,i)
−I(Y i−11 Zni+1;Y2,i|Zi)
]
. (109)
Thus, combining with the previous equality, we end up with:
n(R1 +R2 − 2n)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 )− I(W1;Y n2 Zn) + I(W1W2;Y n2 Zn) (110)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Y
i−1
1 Y
n
2,i+1Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)− I(Y i−11 Zni+1;Y1,i)
−I(W1Y i−11 Y n2,i+1Zni+1;Y2,iZi) + I(Y i−11 Zni+1;Y2,iZi)
+ I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Y
i−1
1 Z
n
i+1Z
i−1;Y2,i|Zi)
−I(Y i−11 Zni+1;Y2,i|Zi)
]
(111)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1Y
n
2,i+1;Y1,i|Y i−11 Zni+1)
− I(W1Y n2,i+1;Y2,iZi|Y i−11 Zni+1)
+ I(Xi;Y2,i|ZiY i−11 Zni+1)
]
+ 2n n , (112)
where (a) is a consequence of introducing the input Xi:
I(W1W2Y
n
2,i+1Z
i−1;Y2,i|ZiY i−11 Zni+1)
≤ I(Xi;Y2,i|ZiY i−11 Zni+1) . (113)
Letting: S1,i = Y n2,i+1, U1,i = W1, V1,i = Y
i−1
1 , and Ti =
Zni+1, and noting that: by resorting to a standard time-sharing
argument we end up with the following single-letter constraint:
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1S1;Y1|V1T )− I(U1S1;Y2Z|V1T )
+I(Xi;Y2|ZV1T ) . (114)
Similarly, we can show the same sum-rate constraint, by
replacing the output Y1 with the two outputs (Y1Y2), which
results in:
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1V2) + I(U1S1;Y1Y2|TV1V2)
−I(U1S1;ZY2|TV1V2) . (115)
C. Proof of Corollary 1
In the previous section, we found that an outer bound on
the secrecy region for the Wiretap BC can be obtained by
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considering only the constraints:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|TV1)− I(U1;Z|TV1) , (116)
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|TV2)− I(U2;Z|TV2) , (117)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1) + I(U1S1;Y1|TV1)
−I(U1S1;ZY2|TV1) , (118)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X;Y1|TZV2) + I(U2S2;Y2|TV2)
−I(U2S2;ZY1|TV2) . (119)
An important claim is then that the auxiliary rvs S1 and S2
can be eliminated with no impediment to the rate region. Since
the region is symmetric in R1 and R2, we only show the claim
for S1. We are looking for a random variable U?1 such that we
can write:
R1 ≤ I(U?1 ;Y1|TV1)− I(U?1 ;Z|TV1) , (120)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X;Y2|TZV1) + I(U?1 ;Y1|TV1)
−I(U?1 ;ZY2|TV1) . (121)
To see this, define the two following functions:
f1(Q) , I(U1;Y1|TV1)− I(U1;Z|TV1)
−I(Q;Y1|TV1) + I(Q;Z|TV1) ,
f2(Q) , I(U1S1;Y1|TV1)− I(U1S1;Y2Z|TV1)
−I(Q;Y1|TV1) + I(Q;Y2Z|TV1) .
We note first that:
f1(U1) = 0 , f2(U1S1) = 0 . (122)
Moreover,
f1(U1S1) + f2(U1)
= −I(U1S1;Y2|TZV1) + I(U1;Y2|TZV1)(123)
= −I(S1;Y2|TZU1V1) (124)
≤ 0 . (125)
Therefore, either f1(U1S1) ≤ 0 and thus, letting U?1 = (U1S1)
will not reduce the region, or f2(U1) ≤ 0 and in this case
U?1 = U allows us to prove our claim. The same holds for the
other couple of constraints on R2 and R1 +R2.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 2: INNER BOUND
In this section, we prove the achievability of the inner bound
stated in Theorem 2. Let R1 and R2 denote the information
rates. Let T be any the time sharing random variable. The
coding argument is as follows.
A. Code generation, encoding and decoding procedures
1) Rate splitting: We split the message intended to each
user of rate Rj into two sub-messages: one of rate R¯j =
Rj − R0j that will be decoded only by the user, and one of
rate R0j that will be carried through the common message.
Thus in stead of transmitting the message pair (w1, w2), we
transmit the triple (w¯0, w¯1, w¯2).{
R¯0 , R01 +R02 ,
R¯j , Rj −R0j ≥ 0 . (126)
Figure 8: Codebook generation and encoding.
2) Codebook generation: Generate 2nT0 sequences qn(s0)
following
PnQ(q
n(s0)) =
n∏
i=1
PQ(q
n
i (s0)) , (127)
where T0 ≥ R¯0 and map these in 2nR¯0 bins indexed by w¯0:
Bn0 (w¯0).
For each s0 ∈ [1 : 2nT0 ] and for each j ∈ {1, 2}, generate
2nTj sequences unj (s0, sj) following
PnUj |Q(u
n
j (s0, sj)|qn(s0)) =
n∏
i=1
PUj |Q(u
n
j,i(s0, sj)|qni (s0)) .
(128)
Map these sequences in 2nR¯j bins indexed by w¯j : Bnj (s0, w¯j)
and consisting in 2n(Tj−R¯j) n-sequences. Each of these bins
are divided into 2nR˜j sub-bins indexed by lj : Bnj (s0, w¯j , lj),
thus each bin contains 2n(Tj−R¯j−R˜j) sequences where 0 ≤
R˜j ≤ Tj − R¯j .
The codebook consisting of all the bins is known to all
terminals, including the eavesdropper.
3) Encoding: Fig. 8 plots the encoding operation. To
send (W¯0, W¯1, W¯2), the encoder selects at random an index
s0 such that qn(s0) ∈ Bn0 (w¯0). Then, in the product bin
Bn1 (s0, w¯1)×Bn2 (s0, w¯2), it chooses at random a pair of sub-
bins Bnj (s0, w¯1, l1) and Bn2 (s0, w¯2, l2) indexed by l1 and l2.
In the corresponding product sub-bin, it looks for a pair of
sequences indexed with s1 and s2 satisfying:
(qn(s0), u
n
1 (s0, s1), u
n
2 (s0, s2)) ∈ Tnδ (QU1U2) . (129)
Based on the Mutual Covering Lemma [27], the encoding will
succeed if the following inequalities hold:
T1 − (R¯1 + R˜1) + T2 − (R¯2 + R˜2) > I(U1;U2|Q) ,
0 ≤ R˜1 ≤ T1 − R¯1 ,
0 ≤ R˜2 ≤ T2 − R¯2 .
(130)
4) Decoding: Upon receiving ynj , decoder j looks jointly
for a pair of indices (s0, sj) such that:(
qn(s0), u
n
j (s0, sj), y
n
j
) ∈ Tnδ (QUjYj) . (131)
From the decoded indices s0 and sj , it can infer the initial
values of both W¯0 and W¯j .
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Based on Lemma 5, the error probability can be made
arbitrarily small provided that:{
Tj ≤ I(Uj ;Yj |Q) ,
Tj + T0 ≤ I(QUj ;Yj) . (132)
B. Equivocation analysis
We find conditions on the rates T0, T1, T2 and R˜1, R˜2 to
achieve perfect secrecy for all message triples (W¯0, W¯1, W¯2).
To this end, we first note that it suffices to find conditions
for which 1nI(W¯0W¯1W¯2;Z
n|C) can be made arbitrarily small
where C denotes the codebook used in the transmission, the
latter constraint leading to the individual secrecy requirements
being fulfilled.
Note that:
I(W¯0W¯1W¯2;Z
n|C)
= n(R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2)−H(W¯0W¯1W¯2|Zn, C) (133)
(a)
= n(R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2)−H(S0S1S2|Zn, C)
+H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, C) , (134)
where (a) follows from that, knowing the codebook, the sent
messages are deterministic functions of the binning indices
chosen.
We first start by giving a lower bound to H(S0S1S2|Zn, C).
Let us write:
H(S0S1S2|Zn, C)
= H(S0|Zn, C) +H(S1S2|Zn, S0, C) (135)
= H(S0|C)− I(S0;Zn|C) +H(S1S2|S0, C)
−I(S1S2;Zn|S0, C) (136)
= nT0 − I(S0;Zn|C) +H(S1S2|S0, C)
−I(S1S2;Zn|S0, C) (137)
= n(T0 + T1 + T2)− I(S0;Zn|C)
−I(S1;S2|S0, C)− I(S1S2;Zn|S0, C) (138)
(a)
= n(T0 + T1 + T2)− I(Qn;Zn|C)
−I(Un1 ;Un2 |Qn, C)− I(Un1 Un2 ;Zn|Qn, C) , (139)
where (a) follows similarly from the fact that, knowing the
codebook, the sent sequences are functions of the chosen
binning indices.
The next lemma provides the main result for carrying on
with the analysis.
Lemma 2. Assuming the codebook generation presented be-
fore, the next inequalities hold true:
I(Qn;Zn|C) ≤ nI(Q;Z) + n n , (140)
I(Un1 ;U
n
2 |Qn, C) ≤ nI(U1;U2|Q) + n n , (141)
I(Un1 U
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C) ≤ nI(U1U2;Z|Q) + n n . (142)
Proof: The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix
B.
Lemma 2 allows us thus to write:
1
n
H(S0S1S2|Zn, C) ≥ T0 + T1 + T2 − I(QU1U2;Z)
−I(U1;U2|Q) . (143)
Now, let us upper bound the remainder term to be studied:
H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, C).
The following Lemma is useful to carry on with the proof.
Lemma 3. Assuming the same coding scheme presented
before, then
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, C)
≤ max {0, I1, I2, I3, I4} , (144)
where
I1 = T1 − R¯1 − I(U1;ZU2|Q) , (145)
I2 = T2 − R¯2 − I(U2;ZU1|Q) , (146)
I3 = T1 − R¯1 + T2 − R¯2
−I(U1U2;Z|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q) , (147)
I4 = T0 − R¯0 + T1 − R¯1 + T2 − R¯2
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) . (148)
Proof: This Lemma is proved in Appendix C.
As a conclusion of this lemma, and combining (134) and
(143) we can conclude that:
1
n
I(W¯0W¯1W¯2;Z
n|C)− n
≤ R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2 − (T0 + T1 + T2) + I(QU1U2;Z)
+I(U1;U2|Q) max {0, I1, I2, I3, I4} (149)
= max
{
R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2 − (T0 + T1 + T2)
+I(QU1U2;Z) + I(U1;U2|Q) ,
R¯0 − T0 + R¯2 − T2 + I(QU2;Z) ,
R¯0 − T0 + R¯1 − T1 + I(QU1;Z) ,
R¯0 − T0 + I(Q;Z) , 0
}
. (150)
Hence, full secrecy is guaranteed by forcing all operands in
the max term to be less than zero.
By collecting all inequalities and applying FME on the
rates R01 and R02 (see details in Appendix D), we obtain
the desired rate region:
R1 ≤ I(QU1;Y1)− I(QU1;Z) , (151)
R2 ≤ I(QU2;Y2)− I(QU2;Z) , (152)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q) + I(QU2;Y2)
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) , (153)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|Q) + I(QU1;Y1)
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) , (154)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(QU1;Y1) + I(QU2;Y2)− I(QU1U2;Z)
−I(U1;U2|Q)− I(Q;Z) . (155)
Obviously, the time sharing variable T can be added and thus,
the achievability of the region (3) is proved.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we investigated the secrecy capacity region of
the general memoryless two-user Wiretap Broadcast Channel
(WBC). We derived a novel outer bound which implies, to
the best of our knowledge, all known capacity results in the
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corresponding setting while by removing secrecy constraints it
performs as well as the best-known outer bound for the general
Broadcast Channel (BC). An inner bound on the secrecy
capacity region of the WBC was also derived by simply using
existent encoding techniques based on random binning and
stochastic encoders. These bounds allowed us to characterize
the secrecy capacity region of several classes of channels,
including the deterministic BC with a general eavesdropper,
the semi-deterministic BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper and
the less-noisy BC with a degraded eavesdropper, as well as
some classes of ordered BCs previously studied. Furthermore,
the secrecy capacities of the BC with BEC/BSC components
and a BSC eavesdropper, as well as the product of two
inversely ordered BC with a degraded eavesdropper were also
characterized.
In the same spirit of Corollary 1, a more general study of the
role of the auxiliary variables of the outer bound in Theorem 1
may lead to the characterization of capacity for other classes
of Wiretap BCs and this will be object of future work.
APPENDIX A
USEFUL NOTIONS AND RESULTS
The appendix below provides basic notions on some con-
cepts used in this paper.
Following [28], we use in this paper strongly typical sets and
the so-called Delta-Convention. Some useful facts are recalled
here. Let X and Y be random variables on some finite sets X
and Y , respectively. We denote by PXY (resp. PY |X , and PX )
the joint probability distribution of (X,Y ) (resp. conditional
distribution of Y given X , and marginal distribution of X).
Definition 11. For any sequence xn ∈ Xn and any symbol
a ∈ X , notation N(a|xn) stands for the number of occur-
rences of a in xn.
Definition 12. A sequence xn ∈ Xn is called (strongly) δ-
typical w.r.t. X (or simply typical if the context is clear) if∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a|xn)− PX(a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ for each a ∈ X ,
and N(a|xn) = 0 for each a ∈ X such that PX(a) = 0. The
set of all such sequences is denoted by Tnδ (X).
Definition 13. Let xn ∈ Xn. A sequence yn ∈ Yn is called
(strongly) δ-typical (w.r.t. Y ) given xn if for all a ∈ X , b ∈ Y∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a, b|xn, yn)− 1nN(a|xn)PY |X(b|a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ ,
and, N(a, b|xn, yn) = 0 for each a ∈ X , b ∈ Y such that
PY |X(b|a) = 0. The set of all such sequences is denoted by
Tnδ (Y |xn).
Delta-Convention [28]: For any sets X , Y , there exists a
sequence {δn}n∈N∗ such that lemmas below hold.4 From now
on, typical sequences are understood with δ = δn. Typical sets
are still denoted by Tnδ (·).
4As a matter of fact, δn → 0 and √n δn →∞ as n→∞.
Lemma 4 ([28, Lemma 1.2.12]). There exists a sequence
ηn −−−−→
n→∞ 0 such that
PnX(T
n
δ (X)) ≥ 1− ηn .
Lemma 5 (Joint typicality lemma [27]). There exists a se-
quence ηn −−−−→
n→∞ 0 such that for each x
n ∈ Tnδ (X):∣∣∣∣− 1n logPnY (Tnδ (Y |xn))− I(X;Y )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηn .
Lemma 6 (Csiszár & Körner’s sum-identity [3, Lemma 7]).
Consider two random sequences Xn and Y n, and a constant
C (independent of time). The following identity holds:
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1;Xi|CXi−1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi−1;Yi|CY ni+1) . (156)
Proof:
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y ni+1;Xi|CXi−1)− I(Xi−1;Yi|CY ni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y ni+1;XiX
i−1|C)− I(Xi−1;YiY ni+1|C)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y ni+1;X
i|C)− I(Y ni ;Xi−1|C)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
Si − Si−1
]
= Sn − S0
= 0
where: Si , I(Y ni+1;Xni |C), and where we define Y nn+1 =
X0 = ∅ which leads to Sn = S0 = 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We want to show the following set of inequalities:
I(Qn;Zn) ≤ n I(Q;Z) + n n , (157)
I(Un1 ;U
n
2 |Qn) ≤ n I(U1;U2|Q) + n n , (158)
I(Un1 U
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn) ≤ n I(U1U2;Z|Q) + n n . (159)
All inequalities can be proved using the same approach, so we
only prove inequality (158).
Let E be the indicator function defined by
E ,
{
1 if (qn, un1 , u
n
2 ) ∈ Tnδ (QU1U2)
0 otherwise (160)
with probability P(E = 1). We have that:
I(Un1 ;U
n
2 |Qn)
≤ I(Un1 , E ;Un2 |Qn) (161)
= I(Un1 ;U
n
2 |Qn, E) + I(E ;Un2 |Qn) (162)
(a)
≤ I(Un1 ;Un2 |Qn, E) + 1 (163)
= P(E = 1)I(Un1 ;Un2 |Qn, E = 1)
+P(E = 0)I(Un1 ;Un2 |Qn, E = 0) + 1 (164)
≤ I(Un1 ;Un2 |Qn, E = 1)
+nP(E = 0) log2(‖U2‖) + 1 , (165)
13
where (a) is due to upper bounding h2(E) ≤ 1. By the
codebook generation, as n grows large, P(E = 0) can be
made arbitrarily small. Note that if encoding is succeeds, only
jointly typical sequences Un1 and U
n
2 are sent. Then, if E = 1,
as a result of Lemma 5, we can have
I(Un1 ;U
n
2 |Qn, E = 1) ≤ nI(U1;U2|Q) + nn (166)
and thus,
1
n
I(Un1 ;U
n
2 |Qn) ≤ I(U1;U2|Q) + 2n . (167)
The remaining inequalities follow in a similar manner and thus
details are omitted here.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In this section, we want to prove the following:
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, C) ≤ max {0, I1, I2, I3, I4} .
To do this, given the output zn and the messages
(W¯0, W¯1, W¯2), let us define S as the set of indices (s0, s1, s2)
falling in the respective messages’ bins, such that:
(qn(s0), u
n
1 (s0, s1), u
n
2 (s0, s2), z
n) ∈ Tnδ (QU1U2Z) . (168)
Then, we can show that the expected size of this list, over all
codebooks, is upper bound by
E(‖S‖) ≤ 1 + 2nI1 + 2nI2 + 2nI3 + 2nI4 , (169)
where:
I1 = T1 −R1 − I(U1;ZU2|Q) , (170)
I2 = T2 −R2 − I(U2;ZU1|Q) , (171)
I3 = T1 −R1 + T2 −R2
−I(U1U2;Z|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q) , (172)
I4 = T0 −R0 + T1 −R1 + T2 −R2
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) . (173)
To see this, one can note that:
E‖S‖ = P{(S0, S1, S2) ∈ S}+
∑
(s0,s1,s2)6=(S0,S1,S2)
P{(s0, s1, s2) ∈ S} .(174)
where (S0, S1, S2) are the true indices chosen by the source.
Due to the LLN and the codebook construction, and Lemma
4, we can show that:
P{(S0, S1, S2) ∈ S} ≥ 1− η (175)
As for the probability of undetected errors, we can distinguish
many cases following the values of (s0, s1, s2). Hereafter, we
give only representative classes of errors.
• If s1 6= S1 and (s0, s2) = (S0, S2), then by similar tools
to Lemma 5, we can show that:
P{(S0, s1, S2) ∈ S} ≤ 2[−nI(U1;ZU2|Q)+nn] (176)
• If s1 6= S1, s2 6= S2 and s0 = S0, then:
P{(S0, s1, s2) ∈ S} ≤ 2[−nI(U1U2;Z|Q)−nI(U1;U2|Q)+nn]
(177)
• Last, if s0 6= S0, then for all (s1, s2),
P{(s0, s1, s2) ∈ S} ≤ 2[−nI(QU1U2;Z)−nI(U1;U2|Q)+nn]
(178)
Now, once the list size has been bounded, by defining
E ,
{
1 if (S0, S1, S2) ∈ S
0 if otherwise (179)
we have that
H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, C)
= I(E ;S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, C)
+H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, E , C) (180)
(a)
≤ 1 +H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, E , C) (181)
(b)
≤ 1 +H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, E = 1, C)
+P(E = 0)H(S0S1S2|W¯0W¯1W¯2) , (182)
where (a) comes from that the entropy of the binary variable
E is upper-bounded by 1 while (b) follows by upper bounding:
P(E = 1) ≤ 1 and
H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, E = 0, C)
≤ H(S0S1S2|W¯0W¯1W¯2) .
By our codebook construction and Lemma 4, again P(E = 0)
can be made arbitrarily small. Next, note that:
H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, E = 1, C)
(a)
= H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, E = 1, C,S, ‖S‖) (183)
≤ H(S0S1S2|E = 1,S, ‖S‖) (184)
=
∑
s∈supp(‖S‖)
P (‖S‖ = s)H(S0S1S2|E = 1,S, ‖S‖ = s) (185)
(b)
≤
∑
s∈supp(‖S‖)
P (‖S‖ = s) log2(s) (186)
= E [log2(‖S‖)] (187)
(c)
≤ log2 (E‖S‖) (188)
(d)
≤ nmax {0, I1, I2, I3, I4}+ log2 (5) , (189)
where (a) follows form the fact that S and ‖S‖ are functions
of the output Zn, the codebook and the chosen messages to
be sent; (b) is a result of that knowing E = 1, the sent indices
(S0, S1, S2) belong to the set S and thus their uncertainty can
not exceed the log cardinality of that set; and finally, (c) is
a consequence of Jensen’s inequality while (d) comes from
(169) along with an application of the log-sum-exp inequality:
log2
(∑
x∈X
2x
)
≤ max
x∈X
x+ log2(‖X‖) . (190)
This, along with the previous remarks yields the desired
inequality:
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(S0S1S2|ZnW¯0W¯1W¯2, C)
≤ max {0, I1, I2, I3, I4} .
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APPENDIX D
FOURIER-MOTZKIN ELIMINATION
We resort to FME, recalling all the constraints:
T1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q) , (191)
T1 + T0 ≤ I(QU1;Y1) , (192)
T2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|Q) , (193)
T2 + T0 ≤ I(QU2;Y2) , (194)
T0 − R¯0 ≥ I(Q;Z) , (195)
T0 − R¯0 + T1 − R¯1 ≥ I(QU1;Z) , (196)
T0 − R¯0 + T2 − R¯2 ≥ I(QU2;Z) , (197)
T0 + T1 + T2 − (R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2) ≥ I(QU1U2;Z)
+I(U1;U2|Q) , (198)
T1 − R¯1 − R˜1 + T2 − R¯2 − R˜2 ≥ I(U1;U2|Q) , (199)
0 ≤ R˜1 ≤ T1 − R¯1 , 0 ≤ R˜2 ≤ T2 − R¯2 .
The resulting rate region after FME is as follows:
R¯1 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q) , (200)
R¯1 + R¯0 ≤ I(QU1;Y1)− I(QU1;Z) , (201)
R¯2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|Q) , (202)
R¯2 + R¯0 ≤ I(QU2;Y2)− I(QU2;Z) , (203)
R¯1 + R¯2 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q) + I(U2;Y2|Q)
−I(U1;U2|Q) , (204)
R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2 ≤ I(QU1;Y1) + I(U2;Y2|Q)
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) , (205)
R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2 ≤ I(QU2;Y2) + I(U1;Y1|Q)
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) , (206)
2 R¯0 + R¯1 + R¯2 ≤ I(QU2;Y2) + I(QU1;Y1)− I(QU1U2;Z)
−I(U1;U2|Q)− I(Q;Z) . (207)
Eliminating rate splitting parameters:
The achievable rate region writes then as:
R1 −R01 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q) , (208)
R1 +R02 ≤ I(QU1;Y1)− I(QU1;Z) , (209)
R2 −R02 ≤ I(U2;Y2|Q) , (210)
R2 +R01 ≤ I(QU2;Y2)− I(QU2;Z) , (211)
R1 −R01 +R2 −R02 ≤ I(U1;Y1|Q) + I(U2;Y2|Q)
−I(U1;U2|Q) , (212)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(QU1;Y1) + I(U2;Y2|Q)
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) ,(213)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(QU2;Y2) + I(U1;Y1|Q)
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) ,(214)
R1 +R2 +R01 +R02 ≤ I(QU2;Y2) + I(QU1;Y1)− I(Q;Z)
−I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) .(215)
Eliminating the rates splitting parameters R01 and R02 with
the positivity constrains: R0,j > 0 and Rj − R0j > 0 for
j ∈ {1, 2}, yields the desired inner bound.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In this section, we show the convexity of the rate region
given by:
R :
{
R1 ≤ (1− e)h2(x) + h2(p)− h2(p ∗ x) ,
R2 ≤ h2(p ∗ x)− h2(p2 ∗ x) ,
(216)
where the union is over x ∈ [0 : 0.5].
Obtaining this result comes to writing an equivalent of Mrs.
Gerber’s Lemma [20] in the presence of an eavesdropper in
the same fashion as in [20]. Our aim will be to show that,
for the corner point of this region, the rate R2 is a concave
function of the rate R1.
Let us define the function f1 as follows:
R1 = f1(x) , (1− e)h2(x) + h2(p)− h2(p ∗ x) . (217)
We have that:
f ′1(x) = (1− e)h′2(x) + (1− 2p)h′2(p ∗ x) , (218)
and,
f ′′1 (x) = (1− e)h′′2(x) + (1− 2p)2h′′2(p ∗ x) , (219)
where:
h′2(x) = log2
(
1− x
x
)
and h′′2(x) = −
1
x(1− x) .
(220)
Let us also define the function f2 as:
R2 = f2(x) , h2(p2 ∗ x)− h2(p ∗ x) . (221)
In the same fashion, we can write:
f ′2(x) = (1− 2p2)h′2(p2 ∗ x)− (1− 2p)h′2(p ∗ x) , (222)
and
f ′′2 (x) = (1− 2p2)2h′′2(p2 ∗ x)− (1− 2p)2h′′2(p ∗ x) . (223)
To show that:
d2R2
dR21
=
d2f2
df21
≤ 0 , (224)
we observe that:
df2
df1
=
df2
dx
dx
df1
=
df2
dx
df−11 (y)
dy
=
1
f ′1(f
−1
1 (y))
df2
dx
=
1
f ′1(x)
df2
dx
. (225)
As such, one can write in the same manner that:
d2f2
df21
=
f ′′2 (x)f
′
1(x)− f ′′1 (x)f ′2(x)
(f ′1(x))
3 . (226)
Since 0 ≤ x ≤ 12 , then 0 ≤ p ∗ x ≤ 12 , and thus, one can
easily check that:
f ′1(x) ≥ 0 . (227)
Thus, it suffices to show that for all x ∈ [0 : 0.5],
f ′′2 (x)f
′
1(x)− f ′′1 (x)f ′2(x) ≤ 0 . (228)
For notation convenience, we let:
a , 1− 2p and a2 , 1− 2p2 . (229)
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Now, one can write that:
f ′′2 (x)f
′
1(x)− f ′′1 (x)f ′2(x)
= a2 h′′2(p ∗ x)
[
(1− e)h′2(x)− a2 h′2(p2 ∗ x)
]
−a22 h′′2(p2 ∗ x)
[
(1− e)h′2(x)− a h′2(p ∗ x)
]
−(1− e)h′′2(x)
[
a h′2(p ∗ x)− a2 h′2(p2 ∗ x)
]
, (230)
and thus
f ′′2 (x)f
′
1(x)− f ′′1 (x)f ′2(x)
h′′2(p ∗ x)h′′2(p2 ∗ x)h′′2(x)
= a2
(1− e)h′2(x)− a2 h′2(p2 ∗ x)
h′′2(p2 ∗ x)h′′2(x)
− a22
(1− e)h′2(x)− a h′2(p ∗ x)
h′′2(p ∗ x)h′′2(x)
− (1− e) a h
′
2(p ∗ x)− a2 h′2(p2 ∗ x)
h′′2(p2 ∗ x)h′′2(p ∗ x)
. (231)
Let us now define a variable α such that: α , 1− 2x. We
have that:
a ·α = 1−2(p∗x) and a2 ·α = 1−2(p2 ∗x) . (232)
Moreover:
h′2(x) = log2
(
1− x
x
)
= log2
(
1 + α
1− α
)
, (233)
h′′2(x) = −
1
x(1− x) = −
4
1− α2 . (234)
Then, to show the desired inequality (228), since:
h′′2(p ∗ x)h′′2(p2 ∗ x)h′′2(x) ≤ 0 , (235)
one only has to show, after some simplifications, that:
−a2
(
1− (a2α)2
) [
a2 − 1 + e (1− (aα)2)] log2(1 + a2α1− a2α
)
+a
(
1− (aα)2) [a22 − 1 + e (1− (a2α)2)] log2(1 + aα1− aα
)
(1− e) (a2 − a22) log2(1 + α1− α
)
≥ 0 . (236)
We will resort to the known series expansion of the log:
log
(
1 + α
1− α
)
= 2
∞∑
k=1
k odd
αk
k
, (237)
to write that the inequality (236), after simplifications, re-
quires:
(a22 − a2)
∞∑
k=5
k odd
αk
[(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
)
Tk −
(
1
k − 4 −
1
k − 2
)
Vk
]
≥ −2
3
α3T3 , (238)
for all α ∈ [0 : 1], where
Tk = (1− e)
(
1− a
k+1
2 − ak+1
a22 − a2
)
+ a22 a
2 a
k−1
2 − ak−1
a22 − a2
(239)
Vk = e a
2
2 a2
ak−32 − ak−3
a22 − a2
. (240)
By hypothesis p2 ≤ p and hence a22 − a2 ≥ 0. We are thus
left with only the analysis of the summation. In the sequel,
we show the following results on summation operand.
Lemma 7 (Properties of some series).
1) The sequence (Tk)k dominates the sequence (Vk)k in
that:
(∀k ∈ Nodd) , Tk ≥ Vk ≥ 0 . (241)
2) If a2 + a22 ≤ 1, then (Vk)k≥5 for k odd is a decreasing
sequence.
3) The following identity holds:
−2
3
α3T3 =
∞∑
k=5
k odd
α3T3
(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
− 1
k − 4 +
1
k − 2
)
.
(242)
Proof: Proof is given in Appendix F.
Indeed, Lemma 7 motivates our choice a2 + a22 ≤ 1 in the
sequel and thus allows us to write:
∞∑
k=5
k odd
αk
[(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
)
Tk −
(
1
k − 4 −
1
k − 2
)
Vk
]
+
2
3
α3T3 (243)
(a)
=
∞∑
k=5
k odd
(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
)
(αkTk − α3T3)
−
(
1
k − 4 −
1
k − 2
)
(αkVk − α3T3) (244)
(b)
≥
∞∑
k=5
k odd
(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
)
(αkVk − α3T3)
−
(
1
k − 4 −
1
k − 2
)
(αkVk − α3T3) (245)
=
∞∑
k=5
k odd
(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
− 1
k − 4 +
1
k − 2
)
(αkVk − α3T3)
(c)
≥ 0 , (246)
where (a) comes from claim (3) in Lemma 7 and (b) results
from claim (1) in Lemma 7 while (c) comes from the fact that
1
k − 2 −
1
k
− 1
k − 4 +
1
k − 2 ≤ 0 , (247)
and hence, since (Vk)k≥5 is a decreasing sequence, then for
all α ∈ [0 : 1] we can write that:
(∀k ≥ 5) αkVk ≤ αkV5 ≤ α3V5 , (248)
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and since:
T3 − V5 = (1− e)(1− a2 − a22 + a2 a22) ≥ 0 , (249)
then,
(∀k ≥ 5) αkVk − α3T3 ≤ 0 . (250)
It is worth mentioning that the assumption a22 + a
2 ≤ 1 was
used only in the monotony of the sequence (Vk).
APPENDIX F
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In this section, we prove the claims stated in Lemma 7.
We start by showing claim (1) which consists to show that
∀k ∈ Nodd, Tk ≥ Vk ≥ 0. Let the sequence (Sk)k∈Nodd defined
as follows:
Sk ,
ak−12 − ak−1
a22 − a2
, (251)
with k − 1 , 2s, then one can write that for all k ≥ 3,
Sk =
s−1∑
j=0
a2 j2 a
2 (s−1−j) . (252)
Now, we know that:
Tk = (1− e) (1− Sk+2) + a22 a2 Sk , (253)
Vk = e a
2
2 a2 Sk−2 . (254)
Let k ≥ 3 for which we have that:
Tk − Vk = (1− e) (1− Sk+2) + a22 a2 (Sk − eSk−2) . (255)
It is easy to check that:
Sk = a
k−3 + a22Sk−2 , (256)
Sk+2 = a
k−1
2 + a
k−1 + a2 a22Sk−2 . (257)
Thus, by substituting these expressions in (255), we end up
with the next equality:
Tk − Vk = (1− e)
(
1− ak−12 − ak−1
)
+a22 a
2 (Sk − Sk−2) (258)
= (1− e) (1− ak−12 − ak−1)
+a22 a
2 (ak−3 + (a22 − 1)Sk−2) . (259)
Now, from the choice of the system parameters (58), we see
that:
max{a, a22} ≤ 1− e ≤ a2 . (260)
Then, to lower bound Tk − Vk we split into the following
cases:
(i) If 1− ak−12 − ak−1 ≥ 0, then
Tk − Vk
= (1− e) (1− ak−12 − ak−1)
+a22 a
2 (ak−3 + (a22 − 1)Sk−2)
≥ a22
(
1− ak−12 − ak−1
)
+ a22 a
2 (ak−3 + (a22 − 1)Sk−2)
= a22
(
1− ak−12 + (a22 − 1) a2 Sk−2
)
= a22(1− a22)
(
1− ak−12
1− a22
− a2 Sk−2
)
(a)
= a22(1− a22)
s−1∑
j=0
a2 j2 − a2
s−2∑
j=0
a2 j2 a
2 (s−2−j)

= a22(1− a22)
s−1∑
j=0
a2 j2 −
s−2∑
j=0
a2 j2 a
2 (s−1−j)

= a22(1− a22)
ak−32 + s−2∑
j=0
a2 j2
(
1− a2 (s−1−j)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0

≥ 0 .
where (a) comes from (252) and some standard manipulations
of multinomial coefficients.
(ii) If 1− ak−12 − ak−1 ≤ 0, then
Tk − Vk
= (1− e) (1− ak−12 − ak−1)+ a22 a2 (ak−3 + (a22 − 1)Sk−2)
≥ (1− ak−12 − ak−1)+ a22 a2 (ak−3 + (a22 − 1)Sk−2)
= 1− ak−12 − ak−1(1− a22)− a22 a2(1− a22)Sk−2
= (1− a22)
(
1− ak−12
1− a22
− ak−1 − a22 a2 Sk−2
)
(a)
≥ (1− a22)
(
1− ak−12
1− a22
− ak−1 − a42Sk−2
)
= (1− a22)
s−1∑
j=0
a2 j2 − ak−1 − a42
s−2∑
j=0
a2 j2 a
2 (s−2−j)

= (1− a22)
s−1∑
j=0
a2 j2 − ak−1 −
s−2∑
j=0
a
2 (j+2)
2 a
2 (s−2−j)

= (1− a22)
s−1∑
j=0
a2 j2 − ak−1 −
s∑
j=2
a2 j2 a
2 (s−j)

= (1− a22)
1− ak−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ a22 − a2 s2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
s−1∑
j=2
a2 j2
(
1− a2 (s−j)
)
≥ 0 ,
where (a) comes from that a2 ≥ a ≥ 0.
This proves our claim. Next, we show that if a2 + a22 ≤ 1
then (Vk)k≥5 is decreasing for k odd. Let k be an odd integer
such that k ≥ 5. We have that:
Vk+2 − Vk
ea2a22
= Sk+2 − Sk . (261)
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We check our last claim by induction, i.e., assuming S7−S5 ≤
0 and
∀k ≥ 5 , Sk+2 − Sk ≤ 0 then Sk+4 − Sk+2 ≤ 0 .
To this end, we have that:
S7 − S5 = a22(a2 + a22 − 1) ≤ 0 . (262)
Let then k ≥ 5, such that Sk+2 − Sk ≤ 0, thus:
Sk+4 − Sk+2
= ak+12 + (a
2 − 1)Sk+2 (263)
= ak+12 + (a
2 − 1) (ak−12 + a2Sk) (264)
= ak+12 − ak−12 + a2
(
ak−12 + (a
2 − 1)Sk
)
(265)
= ak+12 − ak−12︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+a2 (Sk+2 − Sk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(266)
≤ 0 , (267)
which proves the claim. Finally, it is easy to verify that:
− 2
3
α3T3 =
∞∑
k=5
k odd
α3T3
(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
− 1
k − 4 +
1
k − 2
)
,
(268)
by noticing
∞∑
k=5
k odd
(
1
k − 2 −
1
k
− 1
k − 4 +
1
k − 2
)
= −2
3
. (269)
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In this section, we prove the result on the product of the
two inversely less-noisy BC with a more-noisy eavesdropper.
A. Proof of the achievability
The achievability easily follows by evaluating the region:
R1 ≤ I(QU1;Y)− I(QU1;Z) ,
R2 ≤ I(QU2;T)− I(QU2;Z) ,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U1;Y|Q) + I(QU2;T)
= −I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) ,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(QU1;Y) + I(U2;T|Q)
= −I(QU1U2;Z)− I(U1;U2|Q) ,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(QU1;Y)− I(QU1;Z) + I(QU2;T)
= −I(QU2;Z)− I(U1;U2|ZQ) ,
based on the choices: Q = (U1, U2) and U1 = X1 and U2 =
X2 such that PU1X1U2X2 = PU1X1PU2X2 .
The single rate constraints write thus as:
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1)− I(X1;Z1) + I(U2;Y2)− I(U2;Z2) (270)
(a)
= I(X1;Y1|Z1) + I(U2;Y2)− I(U2;Z2) , (271)
where (a) is a result of that Z1 is degraded towards Y1. The
sum-rates follow in a similar fashion, however the last sum-
rate is redundant since:
I(X1;X2|Z1Z2U1U2) ≤ I(X1;X2|U1U2) = 0 . (272)
B. Proof of the converse
Let us concatenate the two outputs Y = (Y1, Y2), Z =
(Z1, Z2) and T = (T1, T2). We start by single rate constraints.
1) Single-rate constraints: By Fano’s inequality and the
secrecy constraint, we have that:
n(R1 − n) ≤ I(W1;Yn)− I(W1;Zn) (273)
≤ I(W1;YnZn1 )− I(W1;Zn) (274)
= I(W1;Y
n|Zn1 )− I(W1;Zn2 |Zn1 ) . (275)
Thus, by standard Csiszár & Körner’s sum-identity (156) and
some basic manipulations, we get that:
n(R1 − n) (276)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Yi|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1;Z2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
(277)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Y1,iY2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1;Z2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
(278)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Y2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1;Z2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
(279)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Y2,i|Zn1,iYi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1;Z2,i|Zn1,iYi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1,iYi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
(280)
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1;Y2,i|Zn1,iYi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1;Z2,i|Zn1,iYi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(X1,i;Y1,i|Z1,i)] , (281)
where (a) follows from that Z1 is degraded respect to Y1 and
(b) comes from the Markov chain:
(Zi−11 ,Y
i−1, Zn2,i+1, Y2,i)−
−X1,i −
− (Y1,i, Z1,i) . (282)
Thus, letting U2,i = W1 and V2 = (Zn1,i,Y
i−1, Zn2,i+1) we
can simply get the rate constraint:
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1|Z1) + I(U2;Y2|V2)− I(U2;Z2|V2) . (283)
2) Sum-rate constraint:
We start by writing:
n(R1 +R2 − n)
≤ I(W1;Yn)− I(W1;TnZn) + I(W1W2;TnZn) (284)
≤ I(W1;YnZn1 )− I(W1;TnZn) + I(W1W2;TnZn)(285)
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(a)
= I(W1;Y
n|Zn1 )− I(W1;TnZn2 |Zn1 )
+I(W1W2;T
nZn2 |Zn1 ) + nn , (286)
where (a) follows from the secrecy constraint. By standard
manipulations, similarly to those used in the proof of the outer
bound in Section V-B, write that:
n(R1 +R2 − n)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1T
n
i+1;Yi|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1Tni+1;TiZ2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1W2T
n
i+1Z
i−1
2 ;Ti|Z2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
(287)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1T
n
i+1;Y1,iY2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1Tni+1;T1,iT2,iZ2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1W2T
n
i+1Z
i−1
2 ;T1,iT2,i|Z2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
(288)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1T
n
i+1;Y2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1Tni+1;T2,iZ2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1W2T
n
i+1Z
i−1
2 ;T2,i|Z2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1T
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1Tni+1;T1,i|T2,iZ2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1W2T
n
i+1Z
i−1
2 ;T1,i|T2,iZ2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
(289)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(W1T
n
i+1;Y2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1Tni+1;T2,iZ2,i|Zn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(X2,i;T2,i|Z2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1T
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1Tni+1;T1,i|T2,iZ2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1W2T
n
i+1Z
i−1
2 ;T1,i|T2,iZ2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
]
.(290)
On one hand, we observe that:
I(W1T
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
−I(W1Tni+1;T1,i|T2,iZ2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W1W2T
n
i+1Z
i−1
2 ;T1,i|T2,iZ2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
= I(W1T
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W2Z
i−1
2 ;T1,i|T2,iZ2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1W1Tni+1)(291)
(a)
= I(W1T
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(W2Z
i−1
2 ;T1,i|T2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1W1Tni+1) (292)
≤ I(W1Tni+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(X1,i;T1,i|T2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1W1Tni+1) , (293)
where (a) follows from that Z2 is degraded respect to T2. On
the other hand, we have that:
I(X1,i;T1,i|T2,iZ1,i)
(a)
= I(X1,i;T1,i|Z1,i)− I(T2,i;T1,i|Z1,i) (294)
(b)
≤ I(X1,i;T1,i|Z1,i)− I(Y2,i;T1,i|Z1,i) (295)
= I(X1,i;T1,i|Y2,iZ1,i) , (296)
where (a) and (b) follow from the Markov chains:
(Y2,i, T2,i)−
−X1,i −
− (Y1,i, Z1,i) (297)
and
(Y1,i, Z1,i)−
−X2,i −
− (Y2,i, T2,i) , (298)
and thus this implies that T2 is less-noisy than Y2. From this
observation, we have:
I(W1T
n
i+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(X1,i;T1,i|T2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1W1Tni+1)
≤ I(W1Tni+1;Y1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1)
+I(X1,i;T1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1W1Tni+1)(299)
= I(X1,i;T1,i|Y2,iZn1Yi−1Zn2,i+1) (300)
≤ I(X1,i;T1,i|Z1,i) . (301)
Then, letting S2,i = Tni+1, the resulting sum-rate reads as:
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1;Y1|Z1) + I(U2S2;Y2|V2)
−I(U2S2;T2Z2|V2) + I(X2;T2|Z2V2) .(302)
The variable S2 can be eliminated in a similar manner as we
already did in Section V-C. Since, Y2 is less-noisy than Z2
and so is T1 towards Z1, then we can show the converse of
the region by letting U2 ≡ (U2, V2) and U1 ≡ (U1, V1).
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